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Last November I went to the American Academy of Religion's annual meeting in Chicago. The sessions on philosophy of religion were notable for having audiences which were 90% to 95% male. On the two panels I saw, out of 11 contributors, chairs and respondents, there was one woman, who, unlike all the others was not an analytic philosopher.

I was especially struck by the discussion at one of the panels in which one philosophical theologian kept referring to the solid heart of Christian belief which had to be accepted as a given before philosophical work could be done. In a slightly unfortunate turn of phrase, he kept referring to this as the dogmatic hardcore. Later in the discussion, he changed the terminology to that of the dogmatic deposit. 

So what is this hardcore, this deposit? It would obviously be too crude for me to associate theological ideas with either pornography or excrement. Far too crude. 

But let's do it anyway.

Because it may not be entirely accidental that a field like philosophy of religion, whose institutional expression is still so male dominated, fails to register how its methods continue to abject material embodiment. One of the great contributions of Pamela's work and of this book in particular is to insist on the social and material locatedness of those who write and speak as philosophers of religion. Specifically, it seeks to make more visible the often implicit gendered assumptions which not only shape the dominant ideas in the field, but also its material practices. Gender here is understood in intersectional terms, in relation to other markers of oppression, including race, sexuality and class. In terms drawn from Virginia Woolf, we are led to ask: do women, do women of colour, do working class women have the room, the time, the resources and the status to write and to be read?

Pamela's own writing takes time to read. It does not so much push us along from one step of the syllogism to the next. Rather, the image it conjures for me is of digging, and hollowing out, gradually moving to enlarge the space in which feminist writing sets its own terms for engaging with philosophy of religion. But to dig and hollow is also to undermine. Pamela's book does not follow the standard order of topics and arguments of a conventional philosophy of religion. My students would be outraged: where's the chapter on Paley's watch and whether God can make stone too heavy for God to lift? And I have to admit to becoming aware of a certain frustration of my own in reading it: damn it, is she going to tell us whether she believes in God or not?! But I think this is not accidental: the style matters, the indirectness matters, because it is of the matter of what she is up to here. She is evoking things that have presented themselves only as absent: to use the imagery she deploys from Le Doeuff and Toni Morrison, Pamela is writing into visibility the red ink in the margins, the invisible goldfish bowls that have specified the limits of what philosophy of religion is and why women have been excluded from it.   In the process, I suggest that Pamela's work removes the aura of untouchability from the hardcore deposit and reveals its obscene impurity, the result of an unjust, defensive anxiety.  

However, in challenging the authoritarianism implied in appeals to an ideal, disembodied observer or divinely male ego ideal, Pamela does not want to surrender rational authority itself. She does not give up on a desire to redeem rationality and truth. As a realist, she is sceptical of Grace Jantzen's feminist philosophy of religion, because it seems to make the divine into a kind of projection which sustains female becoming. For Pamela, this risks descending into wish-fulfilment, and an overly uncritical embrace of Feuerbach's idea that the divine is simply the human writ large and expelled outwards. Perhaps this is not the dogmatic deposit of the Christian analytic theologian, but it is nevertheless a kind of objectification. The world under the horizon of my projection of the divine, conforms to my belief and desire, rather than belief becoming attentive to a reality which we cannot manipulate at will. 

Another aspect of Pamela's defence of rationality emerges in her comments on Sarah Coakley's work. According to Pamela, Coakley's strategy is to exploit the 'soft spots' within dominant theological and philosophical ideas and practices, to revalue supposedly feminine forms of subjectivity. Vulnerability, weakness and trust become sources of power and authority for the female mystic, for example. For Pamela, however, this means risking the eclipse of women by the Big Other, the dominant male God ideal. It surrenders too much of the reciprocity and justice which are essential for women claiming a rational authority and voice of their own.

There is much here that I am challenged and persuaded by, in the overall scope of the book and in detail. But I do want to raise a tangle of issues which emerge from the discussion of the limits of specifically conceptual knowledge. I'm drawing on three things here: first what Pamela writes about the often imperceptible reality of gender exclusions; secondly, her discussion of ineffability in dialogue with Adrian Moore's work; and thirdly, her just mentioned defence of realism in response to Jantzen.

The start of the book draws attention to the imperceptible, both in the hidden ways that domination governs the lives of women, and in the unanticipated ways that medieval and early modern writings by women prefigure a feminism yet to come. An important aspect of feminist philosophy of religion, then, is in writing in a way which touches on the untouchable: not in the sense of a disembodied divine person or observer, but in the sense of those conceptual and discursive forms which materially condition, enable or distort our access to the world and one another. This is a touching on the untouchable in a thoroughly embodied sense (cf Nancy and Derrida on this).

And this connects with the discussion on ineffability in chapter 4. Pamela notes the ambivalence surrounding ideas of infinity and ineffability as they affect women. On the one hand, Pythagorean binaries associate women with the infinite as a term for what is disordered and without secure boundary. On the other hand, it is men who have often been associated with the rationality and spirit which allow them to participate in the infinity of God or the Good, whereas women are bounded, made finite by their particular association with material embodiment. So there is nothing straightforward about the gendering of the infinite or the ineffable. Noting this ambiguity, Pamela draws on Adrian Moore's work, where he defends a notion of ineffability. To cut out proper analysis for the sake of time, Moore draws attention to a kind of knowledge which is not conceptual or concerned with truth itself, but is rather a knowledge of how to deploy concepts. This form of practical know-how, which is evocatively referred to as 'knowing how to be finite' can only result in nonsense when put into words and analysed by the standards of propositional knowledge. But it is nonetheless essential to any attempt to make sense of the world. Moreover, it links with Pamela's own concern to defend rationality whilst also extending it beyond a narrowly disengaged conceptual frame, rooting it in a specific, material, gendered location.  

Now these two points - the touching on the untouchable or imperceptible, and the nonconceptual ineffable condition for knowledge - suggest ways of reconceiving the divine or the infinite, despite this being a task which Pamela seems to wish to avoid. I'd be interested to hear Pamela's comments on whether this might be the case. But I'd also like to hear more on how these ideas relate to her reaction to Jantzen. Now Jantzen, we recall, is putting forward an account of female divine becoming on the basis of a kind of pantheistic dispersal of the divine into embodied desire. Pamela is concerned about the anti-realism and wish fulfilment which this might entail, but I wonder whether her own approach to realism and rationality might not bring her quite close to Jantzen at this point. After all, Pamela also associates yearning and love with the redemption of the value of truth, and clearly relates rational knowledge to embodied capacities which defy direct articulation: the knowable is conditioned by the nonconceptual precisely as ineffable practical know-how for being finite. Here the boundaries between finite and infinite become less stable, less hardcore, one might say. Reality is not infinitely malleable, but nor is it fixed. It is pliable, since the know-how which conditions our use of concepts (especially those concepts we use in an engaged, self-involving way) is itself not fixed (if it were there would be no exit from patriarchy). Producing and using concepts is work, and work transforms the world, or better brings forth the world differently. Reality, concepts and know-how are not severed from one another by an unbridgeable gulf. Critical reflection upon our desires and our locatedness is surely essential to the task of rationality; why else would Pamela so often call for new possibilities and new concepts?

I suggest that we take seriously what Pamela says about philosophy of religion as material work. It is labour, with all the potential for exclusion, exploitation and objectification which that involves - but also the potential for a reworking of the world through concepts of the divine or the infinite which resist commodification. So couldn't there be a critical solidarity between Pamela's project for critical feminist rationality and the yearning which drives it, and Jantzen's concern for divine becoming rooted in the real dynamics of psychic and collective life? If so, why not engage more explicitly with creating some of those new conceptual possibilities for thinking the divine which seem to be required? 

For me, she approaches this most nearly in chapter 7’s discussion of Spinoza, whose nondualistic ‘God or Nature’ conditions an active affirmation of life and joy. Assessing critical feminist appropriations of Spinoza, Pamela writes:

‘Instead of traditional theism we discover in the Spinozist dimentsions of Le Doeuff’s thinking a form of rationalism which has God or Nature (deus sive natura) as its ground: no personal, male-gendered deity is implied, yet a creative corporeality is.’ (152)

Applying this Spinozist approach to the nature of love as an active passion, she adds:

‘Thus the core of love in all its forms is the joy of continued bodily existence. That joy is vulnerable, and yet it is a more sure grounding for our loves than the glorification of unsatisfied desire for a wholly transcendent and disembodied divine.’ (153)

A corporeal, and yet divine creativity is called for, not as what we yield to, but as what we produce in active joy. A work of love, a work of God. Or Nature. 

This returns us to the broader issues which begin Pamela's book. Philosophy of religion names a field of labour. What are the institutional, material conditions which will need to be in place so that many more women write and intervene in the philosophy of religion, to change the field and its imaginary? What could be done practically to prevent the ‘hardcore’ becoming an impenetrable wall denying new concepts being produced by women? How will the red ink be overwritten?

Pamela's own work is a huge contribution to this task. I am enormously grateful to Pamela for compelling me and all of us to face these questions. I am grateful to her for inviting us, in the terms of the Adrienne Rich poem with which she begins, to dive into the wreckage of our philosophy to spy out a threadbare beauty, curving its assertions away from and beyond the disaster of patriarchy.

